>>2726truth is that you can't opsec without first and foremost knowing your counterparty and second knowing your attacker. people who hang out on cyberpunk forums will at best have a drug dealer as a counterparty and nobody particular for an attacker. it's ALL larping, so secure/insecure is entirely moot, like american aircraft carriers, it will never be tested in battle.
but since you asked, here's a sampling of papers from arxiv, now they are mostly mitigation papers, and some of them might've been implemented, but they are mitigation against known attacks, with somewhat pessimistic conclusions. i've kind of grouped the papers into three categories, based on the attack vector.
first group of papers is for when you're trying to use tor to defend yourself against alphabet agenciest. when your attacker has monitoring access to internet relays and internet providers, they can run correlation attacks to automatically deanonymize tor traffic. that's a well known conclusion, and there's evidence from snowden leaks that that's already happening. second is sybil attack, this is more proactive, where instead of monitoring, you're actually controling a large number of tor nodes. this is the kind of attack that a foreign agency can run: no access to underlying network, but can easily purchase machines in u.s. and elsewhere. finally i only include one paper that demonstrates that you can't just route your application over tor and expect it to be magically anonymous, the paper is about exploiting p2p apps to reveal information about user, but it can also serve as a placeholder to remind you that your apps leak in general (i'm sure you can find plenty of papers on arxiv on fingerprinting firefox, etc.)
none of this translates into "tor is compromised omg", but at the very least it ought to keep people from blindly recommending tor as a kind of panacea for internet anonymity.
1)
https://arxiv.org/abs/1505.05173 "We focus on traffic correlation attacks, which are no longer solely in the realm of academic research with recent revelations about the NSA and GCHQ actively working to implement them in practice. "
https://arxiv.org/abs/1410.1823 "The Tor anonymity network has been shown vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks by autonomous systems and Internet exchanges, which can observe different overlay hops belonging to the same circuit. "
2)
https://arxiv.org/abs/1602.07787 "Being a volunteer-run, distributed anonymity network, Tor is vulnerable to Sybil attacks. Little is known about real-world Sybils in the Tor network, and we lack practical tools and methods to expose Sybil attacks. " "Our findings include diverse Sybils …. Our work shows that existing Sybil defenses do not apply to Tor"
https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.4917 "it is easy for exit relays to snoop and tamper with anonymised network traffic and as all relays are run by independent volunteers, not all of them are innocuous." (in the same paper they show that small percentage of exit relays account for bulk of tor traffic)
3)
https://arxiv.org/abs/1103.1518 "Exploiting P2P Applications to Trace and Profile Tor Users"
